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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
WORKIMEN'S COMPENSATION AND THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS
By RALPI H. DWAN*
L [TIGATION arising out of the application of Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts' during the last two decades has written a
new chapter in Anglo-American conflict of laws. During the last
fifteen years, workmen's compensation legislation has swept this
country. Few states have failed to embark upon this social ex-
periment.2 Almost every new session of the various legislatures
brings more or less important changes.
The possible questions are large in number. This paper mere-
ly purpdrts to deal with those which have arisen in English and
American reported cases. It is proposed to organize and classify
the available material 3 with some few comments.
I. Is A COMPENSATION AWARD IN ONE STATE ENTITLED TO
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN OTHER STATES?
Certain phases of this problem already have been raised in the
courts. Two recent cases are Schendel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.
Co.4 and Elder v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.5 In both, the de-
cedent was killed in Iowa.6  In the Schendel Case, an action was
brought in the state district court of Minnesota under the federal
Employer's Liability Act. Shortly thereafter, the defendant insti-
*Of the Faculty of the Law School, University of Minnesota.
'Hereafter, except in quotations, the term Act will be used to mean
Workmen's- Compensation Act unless otherwise qualified.20n December 1, 1925, there were Acts in forty-two states and three
territories. Jones, Workmen's Compensation Laws in the United States
and Territories, published by the Workmen's Compensation Publicity
Bureau, 9th ed., p. 5. Since then, an act has come into effect in Missouri.
See Bulletin No. 423 of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics 306.3No systematic attempt has been made to follow up any statutory
changes which may have been made since the last reported decision in a
particular jurisdiction. Likewise, such statutes as are cited have been
followed up only to the extent of the means available to the writer.
4(1925) 163 Minn. 460, 204 N. W. 552.
5(1925) 163 Minn. 457, 204 N. W. 557.6 The facts of both cases, as stated, are derived from the state re-
ports and from the Supreme Court Reporter.
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tuted a proceeding in Iowa under the Iowa Compensation Act for
arbitration. In that proceeding, it was answered that the decedent
was employed in interstate commerce and that hence the Iowa Act
did not apply. The arbitrators found that the decedent was en-
gaged in intrastate commerce and made a compensation award.
On review by the industrial commissioner, the award was ap-
proved. On appeal to the Iowa district court, final judgment was
entered affirming the award. Thereafter, the action in the Minne-
sota district court was heard, and, in spite of a plea of res judi-
cata, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The facts in the
Elder Case were practically the same except that after the award
in the Iowa proceedings, there had been an application under the
Iowa Act for a review by the industrial commissioner and no
action had been taken upon that application when the judgment
was rendered in the Minnesota district court. From both judg-
ments, there was an appeal in which the action of the Minnesota
district court in refusing to give effect to the Iowa judgment and
decision was assigned as error and challenged as denying them
the full faith and credit enjoined by the federal constitution. 7 The
Minnesota supreme court affirmed both judgments. On certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court" reversed the judgment in the
Schendel Case, but affirmed the judgment in the Elder Case. The
decision in the Elder Case was based upon the fact that the Iowa
decision had not ripened into an enforceable award.
It is of importance to notice that the United States Supreme
Court expressly refused to pass upon the effect of the Iowa award
in the Elder Case if it had become an enforceable award upon re-
view by the industrial commissioner. In the Schendel Case, there
was a judgment in an Iowa court of record.
Is, then, an enforceable award under a Compensation Act
entitled to full faith and credit even though the award was made
by an administrative tribunal and not reduced to judgment in a
court of record? The cases just discussed do not pass upon that
question. However, there would seem to be no valid reason for
not so holding if the award satisfies the requisites which a judg-
ment must satisfy to be entitled to full faith and credit. In fact.
such faith and credit was given to an award of the Texas Indus-
trial Accident Board in a New York caseY
7Art. 4., sec. 1.
8(1926) 46 Sup. Ct. 420.
91n re Phillips, (1923) 206 App. Div. 314, 200 N. Y. S. 639.
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II. WILL A RIGHT TO COMPENSATION ARISING UNDER THE ACT
OF ONE JURISDICTION BE ENFORCED DIRECTLY IN
ANOTHER JURISDICTION?
The nature of this problem has been stated dearly by Judge
Kenyon. in these words :"0
"Is the right of compensation created by the state . . . in its
Workmen's Compensation Law so inseparable from and united
with the remedy provided as to make its enforcement in a particu-
lar method and in a particular tribunal necessary? Its solution
requires consideration of the statutes involved."
The possibilities of enforcement in other jurisdictions under
a certain type of 'Act are shown by two recent federal cases:
Lindberg v. Southern Casualty Co.," and Texas Pipe Line Co. v.
Ware.12 In both cases, an action was brought in another jurisdic-
tion to enforce a right of recovery under the Louisiana Act and
in both cases the action was successful. In the Lindberg Case, the
court tersely said:
"I have examined the act and find that it gives a transitory ac-
tion in the nature of a contractual right cognizable in any court
having jurisdiction of the parties, and that there is nothing in it
which presents any difficulty in examining and enforcing the
claim."
More adequate treatment of the matter is given in the Ware
Case. In his opinion, Judge Kenyon, after stating the real ques-
tion (as above quoted), pointed out that the remedy provided
under the Louisiana Act is in the regular courts. He admitted
that there may be some few provisions of the Act which might be
carried out more easily in the courts of Louisiana but did not
regard such difficulties as insuperable. In fact, as the court point-
ed out, if the right created possesses the necessary characteristics
of a transitory cause of action, any attempt by the legislature to
restrict its enforcement to that state would be abortive."
10 Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware, (C.C.A. 8th Cir 1926) 15 F. (2d)
171, 173.
"(D.C. Tex. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 54.
12(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 171.
'
3Tennessee Coal Co. v. George, (1914) 233 U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct.
587, 58 L. Ed. 997, L. R. A. 1916D 685.
This makes quite inexplicable an earlier federal case. Martin v.
Kennecott Copper Corporation, (D.C. Wash. 1918) 252 Fed. 207. In that
case, recovery under the Alaska Act was denied because of provisions in
the Act that the action should be brought only in the courts of the terri-
tory.
In another recent federal case, an action against the insurer under
the Oregon Act in the federal district court for the district of Oregon
was successful, and was sustained on appeal. No objection appears to
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Judge Kenyon was careful to distinguish this case from cases
involving an Act under which the remedies are before an adminis-
trative tribunal. The leading case involving such a situation is
Logan v. Missouri Valley Bridge and Iron Co.,14 where an unsuc-
cessful attempt was made to recover in Arkansas on a claim aris-
ing under the Oklahoma Act. The court stated that there were
no judicial processes in Arkansas that could be adapted to the
enforcement of the provisions of the Oklahoma Act. A like hold-
ing and similar reasoning is found in a recent case in North Caro-
lina.15 The inference is that the result might be different if there
were substantially similar administrative processes available in the
forum.
III. WHEN DOES THE LOCAL ACT APPLY? HEREIN OF THE SO-
CALLED EXTRA-TERRITORIAL OPERATION OF THE ACTS
Under this heading it is proposed to discuss only a limited
class of cases, viz., those where the sole conflict of laws question
is whether the local Act applies under the facts."0
have been taken to the jurisdiction of the court. Zurich General Acci-
dent & Liability Insurance Co. v. Brunson, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1926) 15 F.
(2d) 906.
14(1923) 157 Ark. 528, 249 S. W. 21.
Like holdings are: Lehmann v. Ramo Films Inc., (1915) 92 Misc.
418, 155 N. Y. S. 1032; McCarthy v. McAllister Steamboat Co., (1916) 94
Misc. 692, 158 N. Y. S. 563; Verdicchio v. McNab & Harlin Mfg. Co.,
(1917) 178 App. Div. 48, 164 N. Y. S. 290.
In Pensabene v. F. &. J. Auditore Co., (1913) 155 App. Div. 368,
140 N. Y. S. 266, motion for leave to appeal denied in 156 App. Div.
888, 140 N. Y. S. 1134, a suit was brought in New York on a claim under
the New Jersey Act. Recovery was denied on the ground that the New
Jersey Act only purported to apply when the contract of hiring was
made in New Jersey, and that no such hiring was set up in the complaint.
In Mosely v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co., (Mo. 1926) 281 S. W. 762,
45 A. L. R. 1223, an action in Missouri based upon the Kansas Act was
unsuccessful. The court said (281 S. W. 762, 768):
"By that statute the right and remedy are so united, and the provi-
sion for liability is so coupled with a provision for a special remedy to
be administered by a designated tribunal with certain specific powers
given, that the remedy must be sought in the designated tribunal."
Cf. an earlier Missouri case, the reasoning of which is less supportable.
Harbis v. The Cudahy Packing Co., (1921) 211 Mo. App. 188, 241 S. W.
960, certiorari quashed. (1922) 292 Mo. 333, 238 S. W. 809.
IsJohnson v. Carolina, etc., Ry. Co., (N.C. 1926) 131 S. E. 390, 394.
16Much has been written upon this question. See particularly: An-
gell, Workmen's Compensation for Injury Abroad, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 619;
37 Harv. L. Rev. 375; 22 Columbia L. Rev. 263; 30 Yale L. Jour. 71; 21
Mich. L. Rev. 449; 9 Calif. L. Rev. 230; 7 Iowa L. Bull. 166; 3 Neb. L.
Bull. 295; Bradbury, Workmen's Compensation, 3rd ed., chap. VII, p. 82;
1 Honnold, Workmen's Compensation, 32, sec. 8; 20 N. C. C. A. 621; 45
A. L. R. 1234.
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The cases often stress the fact that a particular Act is "elec-
tive' 17 or is "compulsory." The meaning of this classification
and the extent and scope of the two classes is expressed as of
July 1, 1926 by a bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor
Statisticsls as follows:
"In most states (32) the employer and employee may exercise
a choice as to accepting the provisions of the compensation law.
Election by the employer is presumed in a majority of the states,
but in 10 positive action is required. Where the employer rejects
the law, actions for damages may be brought without the cus-
tomary common-law defenses. Where he elects to accept the
provisions of the law, the acceptance by the employee is taken for
granted, in the absence of rejection, except in Kentucky, where
positive acceptance is required. In New Hampshire the employee
may make his choice of remedy after the injury has been received.
If the employer has accepted and the employee rejects the law,
actions for damages are subject to the common-law defenses, ex-
cept in 2 states (New Jersey and Pennsylvania), where the de-
fenses are abrogated absolutely.
"The laws are compulsory in 14 states, neither employer nor
employee having the option of choosing another remedy, except
in Arizona, where a workman may elect prior to the injury not to
come under the act. Suit is permitted in a number of states if the
employer has failed to insure or permits premiums to remain un-
paid."
The importance sometimes attached by the courts to the dis-
tinction between these two types of Acts justifies some discussion
of the matter. In view of the coercion exercised upon both the
employer and employee in most of the "elective" Acts by the
juggling of the common-law defenses, it was early seen by com-
mentators on the subject' 9 that such Acts were elective in form
only and that such form was used to escape a fancied constitu-
tional difficulty. Such Acts have been characterized as "psuedo-
elective" and as being "a piece of legislative tricker)'."
In the subsequent discussion, it will be seen that the word
"extraterritorial" is often used with reference to the operation
of the Acts in some of the cases. If all that is meant is that a
certain Act has been applied to accidents occurring outside the
As to the English law, see Elliott, Workmen's Compensation Acts.
8th ed., p. 2; Knowles, Law Relating to Workmen's Compensation, 4th
ed., p. 8.
17Somefimes called "optional."
'SBulletin No. 423, Workmen's Compensation Legislation of the United
States and Canada as of July 1, 1926. The excerpts are from pp. 9, 10.
'
9 See Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 Harv.
L. Rev. 235, 248, 249 and footnotes.
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state, the term is at least descriptive. But the use of the term is
unfortunate because of its other meaning, viz., the application of
the law of a state to matters which had no connection with such
state. Few if any of the cases involved such a situation.
What is the nature of this problem? Under the Act of a given
jurisdiction, the liability of the employer has been subjected to
radical change. Under what circumstance does the Act apply? If
the Act is explicit on the matter, there is no difficulty. There can
be no doubt that the legislature has the power, aside from possible
constitutional limitations, to attach legal consequences to any acts
done within or, indeed, without its territorial limits. 2o The courts
of that jurisdiction, at least, must heed such legislative mandates.
The difficulty arises when the Act contains little or no provision
for this matter. Then the Act must be interpreted. It is not only
possible but in accord with common-law principles for the court
to turn to common-law analogies to aid it in this task of adding a
judicial gloss to the Act if such analogies are sufficiently close.
Conceivable analogies are the conflict of laws rule as to what law
governs tort liability, or the rules as to what law governs the
contract of employment, or, better, the common-law tradition of
imposing certain incidents upon the relation of master and ser-
vant21 when the state has a sufficient interest in that relation.
To show how the courts have attacked this problem, a few
typical cases will be discussed in some detail.
First, an illustration of the efficacy of explicit legislative pro-
vision on this matter is found in a California case, Quong Hain
Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Co1mm. 22 The Act provided:
20See concurring opinion of Olney, J., in Quong Ham Wah Co. v.
Industrial Acc. Comm., (1920) 184 Calif. 26, 44, 192 Pac. 1021, 12
A. L. R. 1190.21See Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 29-31.22(1920) 184 Calif. 26, 192 Pac. 1021, 12 A. L. R. 1190. Another
application of the same provision of the Act is found in Globe Cotton Oil
Mills v. Industrial Ace. Comm., (1923) 64 Calif. App. 307, 221 Pac. 658.
A similar statute was given a like construction in Pickering v. Indus-
trial Commission, (1921) 59 Utah 35, 201 Pac. 1029. See also Home Life
& Accident Co. v. Orchard, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 227 S. W. 705; Empire
Glass, etc., Co. v. Bussey, (1925) 33 Ga. App. 464, 126 S. E. 912.
In Smith v. Van Noy Interstate Co., (1924) 150 Tenn. 25, 262 S. W.
1048, 35 A. L. R. 1409, noted in 34 Yale L. Jour. 453, the contract of em-
ployment was made in Tennessee for work outside the state; the injury
occurred outside the state. The Act specifically provided for compensa-
tion for injuries abroad when there would be compensation had the acci-
dent happened in Tennessee if the contract of employment was made in
Tennessee unless otherwise expressly provided in such contract. Yet, in
holding the Tennesseee Act to apply the court seemed to disregard this
express provision and to base its decision upon a course of reasoning
large parts of which were taken, without indicating it, verbatim from a
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"The commission shall have jurisdiction over all controversies
arising out of injuries suffered without the territorial limits of this
state in those cases where . . . the contract of hire was made in
this state . . ."
In affirming an award made under this provision, the court
aptly described its operation as follows :23
"The contract creates a relationship under the sanction of the
law and the same law attaches as an incident thereto an obligation
to compensate for injuries sustained abroad amounting to a sort
of compulsory insurance. The legislature may lawfully impose
that right and duty upon those operating under a contract subject
to the legislative power, and no principle of lav is defeated by
attaching to such contracts the same duties and rights as incidents
to acts abroad that are lawfully imposed as incidents to the same
acts occurring within the geographical limits of the state."
Likewise, the English Act provides for compensation for in-
juries abroad in certain occupations,2 4 and such provisions have
been applied.25
Where the Act is not explicit on this matter, the decisions show
much contrariety of opinion. Cases illustrating the various views
will be discussed. Because of the advantages in tracing the de-
velopment of a line of thought, the cases in a particular jurisdic-
tion will be treated chronologically, as far as may be.
The English cases uniformly hold that the compulsory English
Act does not apply to injuries abroad, in cases where there is no
express provision in the Act for such application. The leading
English case is Tomalin v. S. Pearson and Son, Ltd."- in which
Michigan case where no such express statutory provision was involved.
Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, (1921) 214 Mich. 218, 183 N. W.
204, 20 N. C. C. A. 621. cited infra note 34.
* 23184 Calif. 26, 36, 192 Pac. 1021, 12 A. L. R. 1190. The court used as
to the liability imposed the unfortunate term "quasi ex contracht."
The California court previously had held that the "compulsory" Cali-
fornia Act, before this provision was inserted, did not apply when the
injury occurred outside the state. North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pills-
bury, (1916) 174 Calif. 1, 162 Pac. 93, L. R. A. 1917E 642.
246 Edw. 7, c. 58, sec. 7 extended the operation of the Act to seamen
injured abroad. By the Amending Act of 1923, 13 and 14 Geo. V. cI. 42,
sec. 27, the Act may be extended by order to crews of aircraft abroad.
Such an order has been made. See Elliott, Workmen's Compensation
Acts, 8th ed., p. 691.25See Bradbury, Workmen's Compensation, 3rd ed., p. 83.
26[1909] 2 K B. 61, 78 L. J. K. B. 863, 100 L T. R. 685, 25 T. L. R.
457, 2 Butterworth's W. C. C. 1.
An earlier case in the Dover County Court used a different method of
reasoning. Hicks v. Maxton, (1907) 124 L. T. Jour. 135, 1 B. W. C. C.
150. There the contract of employment was made in England and the
injury occurred in France. The court, purporting to use the test of
the intention of the parties, said that the lex loci solutionis, not the lex
loci contractus should govern.
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the contract of employment was made in England and the injury
resulting in death occurred in Malta. The widow sought compen-
sation. The Act was held not to apply. The court pointed out
that the widow was not a party to the contract and hence was
simply claiming performance of a statutory duty, but went on to
find that the Act was not intended to operate beyond the territorial
limits of the United Kingdom. This finding was based partly upon
the presumptionI that extraterritoriality was not intended by
Parliament, and partly upon provisions of the Act expressly ex-
tending the operation of the Act to seamen injured abroad.2 8
A similar result was reached in the first case in this country in-
volving a claim for compensation for an injury occurring outside
the state. In Gould's Case,29 the Massachusetts court took the
same starting point that the English courts have taken, viz.,
"In the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, it is
not to be presumed that statutes respecting this matter are de-
signed to control conduct or fix the rights of parties beyond the
territorial limits of the state."
One of the reasons given by the court for its decision was that
to hold otherwise would "give rise to many difficult questions of
conflict of laws." This view has been called, somewhat inaptly,
the "tort theory." It has had small following in this country.30
In cases taking other views, importance frequently is attached
to the "elective" or "compulsory" features of the Act involved.
The Tomalin case has been followed in Schwartz v. India Rubber,
etc., Co., [19121 2 K. B. 299, 81 L. J. K. B. 780, 106 L. T. R. 709, 28
T. L. R. 331, 5 B. W. C. C. 390. Dicta supporting the Tomalin case are
found in: Krzus v. Crow's Nest Pass Coal Co., Ltd., [19121 A. C. 590,
597, 81 L. J. P. C. 227, 107 L. T. R. 77, 28 T. L. R. 488, 6 B. W. C. C, 271 ;
Hunter v. Stadtische Hochseefischerei, etc., [1925] 2 K. B. 493, 507, 18
B. W. C. C. 235.
It is true that the cases, except Hicks v. Maxton, (1o not cover the
situation where the workman hired in Great Britain is himself seeking
compensation for injuries abroad, but the textwriters take it to be settled
that the Act does not apply to injuries abroad save in the enumerated
exceptions. Knowles, Law Relating to Workmen's Compensation, 4th
ed., p. 8; Elliott, Workmen's Compensation Acts, 8th ed., p. 2.
27The court cited Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 213.
28 ee note 24, supra.
29(1913) 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914D 372, 4
N. C. C. A. 60.
This case was followed in Lemieux v. Boston & Maine R. R., (1914)
219 Mass. 399, 106 N. E. 992.
30A similar view was taken in California prior to its statutory
changes. See note 23 supra. Likewise, the Illinois Act was at first held
not to apply to injuries abroad. Union Bridge Co. v. Industrial Com.,
(1919) 287 Ill. 396, 122 N. E. 609. Later a provision was inserted in the
Act by which it applies to employments outside the state where the con-
tract of hire is made within the state. Ill. Laws, 1925, p. 380, sec. 5.
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This distinction already has been discussed to some extent." The
cases under the "elective" acts will be considered first.
Largely because of being pioneers, the New Jersey cases have
exerted much influence in this field. In Anerican Radiator Co. v.
Rogge,3 2 the contract of employment was made in New York for
employment in New York and New Jersey; the injury and death
occurred in New Jersey. In holding the New Jersey Act to
apply, the court used this language:
"The liability is indeed contractual in character by force of the
very terms of the statute, but it is not the result of an express
agreement between the parties; it is an agreement implied by the
law, of a class now coming to be called in the more modern no-
menclature of the books 'quasi-contracts'."
This implied contract was said to be "one of the terms upon
which the performance of a foreign contract of hiring shall be
permitted in this state."
In a later case involving different facts, the New Jersey court
did not qualify its words of contract. In Rounsaville v. Central
R. R. Co.,33 the contract of employment was made in New Jersey;
the accident happened in Pennsylvania. In holding the New Jer-
sey Act applicable, the court said that the question was the simple
one of "whether a New Jersey court will enforce a New Jersey
contract according to the terms of a New Jersey statute." In
fact, the Act was not explicit on this matter.
This "contract" theory has a wide following. 4  Its history and
its complications in Connecticut are of particular interest. In
31See text to footnotes 18 and 19.
-(1914) 86 N. J. L. 436, 92 Atl. 85, 94 At. 85, 7 N. C. C. A. 144,
noted in 2 Va. L. Rev. 470; affirmed in the court of errors and appeals
"for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Swayze in the supreme court."
,87 N. J. L. 314, 93 Atl. 1083; writ of error to New Jersey supreme court
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 245 U. S. 630, 38 Sup. Ct. 63, 62
L. Ed. 520. This case was followed in Davidheiser v. Hay Foundry &
Iron Works, (1915) 87 N. J. L. 688, 94 Ad. 309; and in West Jersey Trust
Co. v. P. & . P. Co., (1915) 88 N. J. L. 102, 95 Ati. 753, reversed
in 90 N. J. L. 730, 101 Atl. 1055 because interstate commerce involved.
33(1915) 87 N. J. L 371, 94 At. 392; reversed in (1917) 90 N. J. L.
176, 101 Ati. 182 because the injury was in interstate commerce.341n the following cases (other than those discussed elsewhere), the
"contract theory" was used in holding the local Act applicable when the
injury occurred outside the state:
CoLoamo-Industrial Commission v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., (1918) 64
Colo. 480, 174 Pac. 589, 3 A. L. R. 1336. The court made an interesting
admission:
"The very purpose of the provision [denying in negligence cases the
defenses of assumed risk, the fellow-servant rule, and contributory negli-
gence] is to induce employers to accept the compensation law, in so
denying such defenses...."
Compare that statement with the text to notes 18 and 19.
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Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co.,"5 the contract of employment
was made in Connecticut for performance partly within and part-
ly without the state. The Connecticut Act was held to apply.
Considering the general purpose of the Act and the difficulties
which would arise for both the employers and employees if they
could not be sure what Act was to apply, the court found the
local Act to provide "for compensation arising out of a contract
of employment authorized by our Act for injuries suffered without
our jurisdiction." In Douthwright v. Champlin,"0 the contract of
hire was made in Massachusetts. Certain work was to be done
in Connecticut and both parties expressly accepted the Connecticut
Act. The Connecticut Act was held to apply. The court stressed
the fact that the Massachusetts Act, under the holding in Gould's
Case,37 did not apply to injuries outside of the state. It is of
interest to notice the dictum of the court that the result would
have been the same without the express acceptance if there had
been absence of refusal. Then, said the court, the law would make
[But recovery under the Colorado Act has been denied when the
injury occurred in Colorado but the contract was made elsewhere. Hall
v. Ind. Comm., (1925) 77 Colo. 338, 235 Pac. 1073.]
IowA-Pierce v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., (1919) 185 Iowa 1346,
172 N. W. 191. In this case it was argued (185 Iowa 1346, 1360) that
since the Act provided (Iowa Code Supplement 1913, sec. 2477-m 29)
that the hearings should be held in the place where the injury occurred,
and since they could not be held outside the state, the Act could not apply
to injuries occurring outside the state. The force of this argument was
denied by the court. The basis for the argument has been removed by
express provisions for the place of hearing when the injury occurred out-
side the state. Iowa Laws 1919, Ch. 220, sec. 8; Iowa Code 1924, sec.
1440.
MICHIGAN-Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, (1921) 214 Mi h.
218, 183 N. W. 204; 20 N. C. C. A. 621. This case was followed in Hutls-
wit v. Escanaba Mfg. Co., (1922) 218 Mich. 331, 188 N. W. 411. The
present Act expressly applies to injuries abroad "in those cases where the
injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of the injury, and
the contract of hire was made in this state . . ." Acts of 1921, No. 173,
part III. Query whether the restriction as to residents is constitutional.
Cf. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., (1920) 184 Cal. 26, 192
Pac. 1021, 12 A. L. R. 1190.
RHODE ISLAND-Grinnell v. Wilkinson, (1916) 39 R. I. 447, 98 Atd.
103, L, R. A. 1917B 767, Ann. Cas. 1918B 618, noted in 1 MINNESOTA LAW
REvIEw 531.
WEST VrRGINr.-Gooding v. Ott, (1916) 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S. E.
862, L. R. A. 1916D 637, noted in 3 Va. L. Review 552, 14 Mich. L. Rev.
524. This case was followed in Foughty v. Ott, (1917) 80 W. Va. 88,
92 S. E. 143, where the requirement seemed to be made that the cm-
ployment include work to be done in West Virginia.
35(1915) 89 Conn. 367, 94 Ati. 372, L. R. A. 1916A 436. There was
also an admiralty question involved in the case.
36(1917) 91 Conn. 524, 100 At. 97. Ann. Cas. 1917E 512, 15 N. C. C. A.
870, noted in 27 Yale L. Jour. 113.
37(1913) 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914D 372, 4 N. C.
C. A. 60. See text to note 29 supra.
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the same addition to the contract. In Banks v. Howlett Co.'s as
the court construed the facts, the contract was made in New York
for services in Connecticut where the injury occurred. Again
the Connecticut Act was held to apply. The court said that since
the contract was made with specific reference to services in Con-
necticut, it had incorporated in it automatically the provisions for
compensation in the Connecticut Act. The last case was carefully
limited to its facts in Hopkins v. Matchless Metal Polish Co.30
There the contract was made in New Jersey contemplating ser-
vices in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York; the injury
occurred in Connecticut. The Connecticut Act was held not to
apply.
In the course of its opinion, the court supported its *contract
theory against the charge that such a construction prevents a later
amendment of the Act from becoming part of the contract. The
court answered:
"We think this a misconception of the effect of the election by
an employer or employee. His election, as a matter of law, incor-
porates the provisions of the Act and any subsequent amendments
thereto as a part of the contract. No violation of a right of con-
tract can arise out of this, since it is by'his own election that the
Act and subsequent amendments are incorporated in his contract."
The theoretical difficulties involved in this course of decision in
Connecticut were recognized in Pettiti v. T. I. Pardy Const. Co.'
There the contract was made in Connecticut with the "specific and
sole subject of that contract being performed in Massachusetts,"
where the injury occurred. In holding the Connecticut Act to
apply, the court expressly overruled the Banks Case."1
This "contract theory" has led the Indiana courts also into
difficulties. In Carl Hagenback, etc., Shows Co. v. Leppert,2 the
contract was made in Indiana; the injury occurred in Illinois.
The Act expressly provided that with certain exceptions every
employer and employee under the Act "shall be bound by the
provisions of the Act whether injury . ..occurs within the state
or in some other state . . ." Yet, in holding the Indiana Act to
apply, the court talked of the right as being contractual. In
Hagen back, etc., Show. Co. v. Randall,43 the contract made in
38(1918) 92 Conn. 368, 102 At. 822, noted in 27 Yale L. Journ. 707.
39(1923) 99 Conn. 457, 121 Atl. 828.40(1925) 103 Conn. 101, 130 Atl. 70, noted in 35 Yale L Journ. 118.41See note 38, supra.
42(1917) 66 Ind. App. 261, 117 N. E. 531.
43(1920) 75 Ind. App. 417, 126 N. E. 501. This case was followed
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Ohio expressly provided that with reference to Employer's Lia-
bility Acts and other matters, the laws of the District of Columbia
should govern the contract; the injury occurred in Indiana. The
employer, an Indiana corporation with offices in Indianapolis, was
in the show business. The employment was for work in many
states including Indiana. The Indiana Act was held to apply.
The court pointed out that under the Indiana Act, "acceptance" was
presumed in the absence of notice to the contrary, which notice
was never given. The court reasoned that the Act expressed the
public policy of the state and that the court would not enforce a
contract contravening that policy. The court said that the obliga-
tion under the Indiana Act was "superimposed upon the Ohio con-
tract as a condition of its performance in this state." In Darsch
v. Thearle Duffield, etc., Co.,"4 both parties were residents of Il-
linois where the contract was made; the injury occurred in Indiana
while the employee was only temporarily in that state. In holding
the Indiana Commission to be without jurisdiction to make an
award, the court said that the provisions of the Indiana Act as
to presumed acceptance were "intended only to apply to such per-
sons as were residents of this state and made their contracts of
employment here, or made such contract[s] with reference to
their performance, at least in part, within this state, or maintained
an office and place for doing business within this state." In
Johns Manvile Inc. v. Thrane,4" the contract was made in Illi-
nois or Indiana (the court said it was immaterial) contemplating
performance in Indiana, where the injury occurred. The em-
ployer was an "Indiana employer ;" the employee was an "Indiana
employee." In holding the Indiana Act to apply, the court stressed
the fact that the contract was to be performed in Indiana. In
Bement Oil Corporation v. Cubbison,"4 the contract was not made
in Indiana, nor was it to be performed there; the injury occurred
in Arkansas. The Indiana Act was held not to apply. The court
said that the fact that the employer maintained its principal place
of business in Indiana and that the employee was a resident of
Indiana did not make the Indiana Act applicable, and intimated
that to hold it applicable on that basis would violate the "privi-
in Hagenback, etc., Show Co. v. Ball, (1920) 75 Ind. App. 454, 126 N. E.
504.
44(1922) 77 Ind. App. 357, 133 N. E. 525. This case was followed in
a recent case under similar facts. Norman v. Hartman Furniture &
Carpet Co., (Ind. App. 1926) 150 N. E. 416.
45(1923) 80 Ind. App. 432, 141 N. E. 229.46 (Ind. App. 1925) 149 N. E. 919.
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leges and immunities" clause 7 of the federal constitution. To add
to the confusion, there is the recent case of Leader Specialty Co.
v. Chapmans.4  There the contract was made by correspondence,
the offer being sent from Indiana and the acceptance being mailed
from South Carolina. The work was to be done in Georgia. It
does not appear where the injury occurred. In holding the In-
diana Board to be without jurisdiction, the court said that the
parties might have contracted that their rights be governed by
Indiana law, but had not done so; that the presumption is that
the contract was made with reference to Georgia law; and that
hence the remedy was under the law of Georgia.
This risum=6 of the use of the "contract theory" in the juris-
diction which have given it its greatest development indicates the
ramifications of the theory and some of the absurdities in reason-
ing to which it has lead. At the risk of repetition, it may be worth
while to state some of the reasons why the theory is based upon
a fiction. This has been well stated as follows :40
"The assent is ordinarily conclusively presumed in the absence
of notice to the contrary. Moreover, certain penalties are attached
to the election not to adopt the Act. It is still harder to say that
the parties agree to accept subsequent amendments. And to work
out a consideration for the opportunity usually afforded to one or
both parties to withdraw at any time before injury demands more
fiction."
Other reasons suggest themselves. For example, the parties
cannot contract out of any particular provisions of the Act.
The cases in a few more jurisdictions with "elective" Acts
remain to be discussed. Minnesota has developed and followed
consistently a theory of its own. In the first case, State e.r rel.
Lena Chambers v. District Court," the contract was made in Min-
nesota where the business of the employer was centralized; the
injury occurred in North Dakota. In holding the Minnesota Act
to apply, the court, after mentioning but not stressing the contract
obligation arising under the Act, went on to say:
"When a business is localized in a state there is nothing in-
consistent with the principle of the compensation Act in requiring
the employer to compensate for injuries in a service incident to
its conduct sustained beyond the borders of the state."
47Art. 4, sec. 2. Cf. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm..
(1920) 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021, 12 A. L. R. 1190.
48 (Ind.-App. .1926) 152 N. E. 872.
4 37 Harv. L. Rev. 375, 376. See also Smith, Sequel to Workmen's
Compensation Acts, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 235, 248.
50(1918) 139 Minn. 205, 166 N. W. 185, 3 A. L. R. 1347. For the
subsequent history of this case, see (1919) 141 Minn. 348, 170 N. W. 218.
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This "localization" theory has been followed in a number of
cases.5 ' It is of interest to notice, however, that in every case so
far the court has been able to find that the business was localized
in Minnesota. What will be done when a case arises in which
such a finding cannot be made remains to be seen.
The courts of Maine 52 and Nebraska 53 have dealt with these
questions without adhering to or adding any distinctive theory.
Next will be considered how the courts have treated this prob-
lem in states having "compulsory" Acts.
In New York, where the Act contains "compulsory" provi-
sions relative to "hazardous" employments, the leading case is
Matter of Post v. Burger & Gohlke.5 4  There the contract of
employment was made in New York where the employee worked
regularly; the injury occurred in New Jersey on a temporary job.
The New York Act was held to apply. By construing the whole
Act, the court found it to have been the intention of the legisla-
ture "to require that in every contract of employment in the cases
provided by the Act, there should be included and read into the
contract the provisions of the Act, and that such provisions should
be applicable in every case of injury wherever the employee is
5"State ex rel Maryland Casualty Co. v. District Court, (1918) 140
Minn. 427, 168 N. W. 177, noted in 28 Yale L. Journ. 189; Stansberry v.
Monitor Stove Co., (1921) 150 Minn. 1, 183 N. W. 977, 20 A. L. R. 316.
Krekelberg v. M. A. Floyd Co., (1926) 166 Minn. 149, 207 N. W. 193,
noted in 24 Mich. L. Rev. 738.
"-Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., (1921) 119 Me. 552, 112 Atl.
516. The contract was made in Massachusetts; the injury occurred in
Maine. The employee was a resident of New York; the employer was
a foreign corporation. The claimant had applied for compensation in
New York, where the New York Act was held not to apply. (Smith v.
Heine Safety Boiler Co., infra note 58.) In holding the Maine Act to
apply, the court pointed out that the employer was carrying on business
in Maine at the time of the accident, and such business was not of a
casual or transitory character within the meaning of the Act. The New
York decision did not preclude the claimant since the New York court
did not adjudicate upon the merits.
5"McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Co., (1924) 111 Neb. 609, 197 N. W.
615, noted in 3 Neb. L. Bull. 295. The contract was made in Nebraska
for work to be performed in Iowa where the injury occurred. The em-
ployee was a resident of Nebraska, and the employer's principal place of
business was there. The Nebraska Act was held to apply. The court
said the Act "should be so construed that technical refinements of interpre-
tation will not be permitted to defeat it."
54(1916) 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351, Ann. Cas. 1916B 158, 10
N. C. C. A. 888, noted in 3 Va. L. Rev. 552.
There is an earlier case which was decided upon a construction of
a provision of the Act as to a special situation. Edwardsen v. Jarvis
Lighterage Co., (1915) 168 App. Div. 368, 153 N. Y. S. 391.
One of the cases applying the rule of the Post case is Holmes v.
Communipaw Steel Co., (1919) 186 App. Div. 645, 174 N. Y. S. 772.
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engaged in the employment." Two later cases,55 decided without
opinion, seem to extend the rule of the Post Case to situations
where the work contemplated by the contract was entirely outside
the state.-5  However, cases in the lower courts throw some doubt
upon this.5 7  A slight limitation was made in Smith v. Heine
Safety Boiler Co.5" There the contract was made in New York
but before there was any Act in New York. Also no hazardous
business was carried on by the employer in New York
at the time of the accident abroad. In fact, the plant was moved
before the Act was passed. The New York Act was held not to
apply. The court said that when the accident happened, the
employer "was subject to no duty to insure its employees under
our law, except, indeed, such employees as it might send within
our state." Judge Cardozo, in describing the nature of the liability
under the Act used the unfortunate term "quasi ex contractu."
But he went on in excellent vein:
"Contractual in a strict sense, of course, the liability is not.
If the parties were to agree that it should not attach, the courts
would disregard their agreement. A duty is imposed by law on
employers conducting a hazardous employment in New York to
insure their workmen against injury, and the insurance covers
injuries incidental to that employment though suffered in another
state. The contract creates the relation to which the law attaches
the duty, and the same law which imposes the duty defines its
orbit and its measure."
From these cases, it follows that there can be no recovery
under the Act when the contract was not made in New York
and the injury was abroad.59 The test, as it now seems to be,
55Klein v. Stoller & Cook Co., (1917) 220 N. Y. 670, 116 N. E. 1055;
Fitzpatrick v. Blackall & Baldwin Co., (1917) 220 N. Y. 671, 116 N. E.
1044.
56Support for this is also found in Matter of Hospers v. Hungerford-
Smith Co., (1921) 230 N. Y. 616, 130 N. E. 916, also decided without
opinion. See also Minto v. Hitchings & Co., (1923) 204 App. Div. 651,
198 N. Y. S. 610.57Gardner v. Horseheads Const. Co., (1916) 171 App. Div. 66, 156
N. Y. S. 899. That case is commented upon in: Minto v. Hitchings &
Co., (1923) 204 App. Div. 661, 198 N. Y. S. 610; Thompson v. Founda-
tion Co., (1919) 188 App. Div. 506, 177 N. Y. S. 58; Royal Indemnity Co.
v. P. & W. Refining Co., (1917) 98 Misc. 631, 634, 163 N. Y. S. 197.
Also in Perlis v. Lederer, (1919) 189 App. Div. 425, 178 N. Y. S. 449,
the Act was held not to apply where the contract was made in New York
for services to be performed wholly in another state. The court said
that such a contract "is without the police power of the state of New
York." Contra, State Industrial Commission v. Barene, (1919) 107 Misc.
486, 177 N. Y. S. 689.58(1918) 224 N. Y. 9, 119 N. E, 878, Ann. Cas. 1918D 316.59Thompson v. Foundation Co., (1919) 188 App. Div. 506, 177 N. Y. S.
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recently has been thus expressed, 0 "whether at the time of the
accident the employer was carrying on a hazardous employment
within the state of New York, and whether the claimant suffered
an injury incidental to that employment, though suffered in
another state." The decisions in the other recent cases"' follow
from what is said above.
The courts of Ohio"2 and North Dakota 3 also have dealt with
this problem under "compulsory" Acts.
To summarize, the courts have been faced again and again
with the task of determining whether the local Act applies in a
given situation. In determining that question, there is properly
no difficulty when the Act is explicit with regard to that particu-
lar situation. But when the Act is not explicit, the problem
becomes one of interpretation. To aid them, the courts naturally
have turned to analogies to be found in the general body of the
law of Conflict of Laws.
It may be conceded that, subject to possible constitutional
limitations, the legislature could provide for the extension of the
operation of the Act to matters having no connection with that
jurisdiction, and that such a provision would be binding upon the
courts of that jurisdiction. But in the absence of such an express
provision, in view of orthodox Anglo-American theories of the
territorial scope of the law of a particular jurisdiction, it is not
60Donohue v. Robertson Co., (1923) 205 App. Div. 176, 199 N. Y. S.
470.GlSee Baggs v. Standard Oil Co., (1920) 180 N. Y. S. 560; Mad-
derns v. Fox Film Co., (1923) 205 App. Div. 791, 200 N. Y. S. 344.621n Industrial Commission v. Ware, (1919) 10 Ohio App, 375, the
employer was a contractor of Ohio, and was a member of and partici-
pant in the state insurance fund of Ohio; the injury occurred in Ken-
tucky. No averment was made that the contract was made in Ohio or
that the labor was to be performed there. The Ohio Act was held not
to apply. The court said that to come within the policy of the statute.
the claimant must be an Ohio workman and must be either employed in
Ohio or employed to work there. The court regarded the decision of
the supreme court in this case (98 Ohio St. 458) as implying that the
Act may apply where the contract is made in Ohio for work partly or
primarily in Ohio and the injury occurs while the workman is temporar-
ily or casually out of the state.631n Altman v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, (1923)
50 N. D. 215, 195 N. W. 287, 28 A. L. R. 1337, the contract was made
in North Dakota for labor to be performed in Washington where the
injury occurred. The North Dakota Act was held not to apply. The
court stressed the fact that the employment in Washington was not merely
incidental to employment in North Dakota. The court said:
"The state, through the bureau, makes the necessary levies, called
premiums, on employers, collects the fund, using the governmental
machinery for the purpose, and disburses the same to employees within
the law. There is nothing contractual in connection with the creation of
the fund or the payment of benefits thereunder."
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surprising that the courts have sought to find some act or relation
within the jurisdiction to which the Act will attach legal conse-
quences. However, in determining what it is to which those
legal consequences will be attached, the courts have differed.
Which view is the best the writer does not say. A suggestion as
to the proper explanation of the cases holding the local Act to
apply, with varying limitations, when the contract of employment
is made within the jurisdiction and the injury occurs abroad is
offered. Where the Act is compulsory, the view taken by the
New York and California courts that the Act imposes incidents
upon the relation created by the contract which contract is under
the control of the state is entirely sound.
With regard to the elective Acts, the cases under them must
rest upon substantially the same basis. The fictional nature of
the theory that there is a contract to come within the Act in the
sense of a consensual undertaking with the other requisites of a
contract already has been discussed.8 ' The only tenable theory,
it is submitted, is that well expressed by the Wisconsin court :"n
"Neither, in our opinion, does the fact that the law has an
elective feature and is not compulsory materially affect the ques-
tion ...
"The liability of the employer under the Act being statutory,
the Act enters into and becomes a part of every contract, not as a
covenant thereof, but to the extent that the law of the land is a
part of every contract."
The attitude of the court in construing the Act is also enlighten-
ing. It pointed out that the language of the Act did not expressly
nor by necessary implication limit its operation to injuries occur-
ring in the state; hence the legislative intent could be ascertained
by a consideration of the legislative purpose, including the eco-
nomic policy back- of the Act that an industry bear its own losses
through injuries regardless of state lines.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE RECEIPT OF Co.iPENSATION UNDER
THE ACT OF ONE JURISDICTION UPON A RECOVERY UNDER
THE ACT OF ANOTHER JURISDICTION
The cases discussed under the preceding heading have shown
the possibility of the courts of two or more jurisdictions holding
their own Act to apply to the same injury."" Suppose that com-
"4See text to note 49.
65Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (1919) 169 Wis. 106, 113, 115,
170 N. W. 275, 171 N. W. 935.
6OSee Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Deci-
sions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 542.
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pensation payments are made under the Act of one state, and
later an award is made under the Act of another state. What will
the courts and administrative tribunals of the latter state do about
such payments?
This problem has arisen in the courts of New York and has
been disposed of cursorily. In Jenkins v. Hogan & Sons, Inc.,67
the contract of employment was made in New York, and the
injury occurred in New Jersey. The claimant had accepted ninety
dollars under the New Jersey Act and had executed an affidavit
of release. The New York Act was held to apply, and the
receipt and release not to bar recovery. Provision, however, was
made for the filing of the affidavit as a receipt for the payment
of ninety dollars. A further step was taken in Gilbert v. Des
Lauriers Colum Mould Co.,68 in which the contract was made in
New York and the injury occurred in New Jersey. The claimant
made application for compensation under the New Jersey Act
and received some payments thereunder. Later an award was
made in New York crediting the insurance carrier with the amount
paid under the New Jersey proceeding. In affirming the award,
the court said that the New Jersey Proceeding did not deprive the
New York commission of jurisdiction. In fact, the court ex-
pressed doubt whether the New Jersey commission ever had
jurisdiction of the case. A limitation upon this doctrine was made
in Minto v. Hitchings & Co."9 There the claimant hired out in
New Jersey with an employer who carried on his principal busi-
ness there. The injury occurred in New York. The claimant
applied for and was awarded compensation under the New Jersey
Act. Later he was awarded compensation under the New York
Act with deductions for the amounts paid under the New Jersey
proceedings. The appellate division, apparently assuming that
the New York Act applied, reversed the award on the ground
that the claimant was estopped from seeking like redress in New-
York. This case was itself limited to its facts in a most conus-
ing opinion in Anderson v. Jarrett Chambers Co.,70 where the
findings of the board were that the contract was made in New
York, the principal place of business of the employer, and the
injury occurred in New Jersey. The acceptance of compensation
under the New Jersey Act was said not to bar a claim for comi-
67(1917) 177 App. Div. 36, 163 N. Y. S. 707.
68(1917) 180 App. Div. 59, 167 N. Y. S. 274.
69(1923) 204 App. Div. 661, 198 N. Y. S. 610.
70(1924) 210 App. Div. 543, 206 N. Y. S. 458, noted in 10 Coruell L.
Quart. 364.
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pensation under the New York Act. Final disposition of the
case was not made, however.--
In connection with this matter, a dictum of the New Jersey
court in Rounsaville v. Central R. R. CoJ is of interest:
"It is enough for the present to say that recovery of compen-
sation in two states is no more illegal, and is not necessarily more
unjust than recovery upon two policies of accident or life insur-
ance."
V. THE EFFECT OF THE LOCAL ACT OR THE ACT OF ANOTHER
JURISDICTION UPON A COMMtON-LAw ACTION FOR DAMAGES
OR SOME OTHER ACTION NOT BASED UPON A WORK-
ME[EN'S COIPENSATION ACT
Under this heading cases in which other matters are involved
will not be considered. Those cases will be left to be stated under
the next heading.
Except in the North Carolina cases, which will be considered
presently, it uniformly has been held that any other form of
relief will be denied if the plaintiff has a remedy under the Act
of another jurisdiction." The theories used in determining
whether the Act of the other jurisdiction applies are as numerous
71The award was reversed and the claim remitted to the board because
of insufficiency of the record to sustain the findings. No mention was
made of crediting the sums paid under the New Jersey Act, but such a
statement was not called for as the case was presented to the court. For
the subsequent disposition of the case, see (1925) 215 App. Div. 742, 212
N. Y. S. 765, affirming an award in favor of the claimant, affirmed in
(1926) 242 N. Y. 580, 152 N. E. 435.
72(1915) -87 N. J. L 371, 374, 94 Atl. 392. For the subsequent disposi-
tion of this case see note 33, supra.
73Cases involving the Acts of foreign countries are: Beyer v. Ham-
burg-American S. S. Co., (C.C. N.Y. 1909) 171 Fed. 582; Schweitzer v.
Hamburg Am. Line (1912) 78 Misc. 448, 138 N. Y. S. 944; The Falco,
(D.C. N.Y. 1926) 15 F.(2d) 604.
Some of the cases involving the Acts of other states in this country
are: Shurtliff v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., (Utah 1925) 241 Pac. 1058;
Albanese v. Stewart, (1912) 78 Misc. 581, 138 N. Y. S. 942; Wasilewski v.
Warner Sugar Refining Co., (1914) 87 Misc. 156, 149 N. Y. S. 1035;
Pendar v. H. & B. American Mach. Co., (1913) 35 R. I. 321, 87 At. 1,
L. R. A. 1916A 428, 4 N. C. C. A. 600; Bonner v. Tucker Stevedoring Co..
(1916) 25 Pa. Dist. Rep. 600; Bozo v. Central Coal & Coke Co., (192-0) 57
Utah 243, 193 Pac. 1111.
A fortiori, the same is true when the local Act applies to the injury.
Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (1919) 169 Wis. 106, 170 N. W. -75.
171 N. W. 935. In St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Carros, (19-) 207
Ala. 535, 93 So. 445, the contract was made in Alabama; the injury
occurred in Mississippi. This was an action for damages. The Alabama
Act provided for compensation for injuries abroad when the contract was
made in Alabama unless there was an express provision to the contrary
in the contract. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. This judgment
was affirmed on the ground that there was no pleading to raise the question
of the effect of this provision of the Act.
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as those used in determining the application of the local Act.
Thus in Johnson v. Nelson,14 the contract of employment appar-
ently was made in Minnesota to be performed in Wisconsin; the
injury occurred in Wisconsin, the Act of which the employer
expressly had "accepted". Recovery in a common-law action for
damages was denied on the ground that the sole remedy open to
the plaintiff was under the Wisconsin Act. The Minnesota court
invoked the rule that matters pertaining to the performance of
contracts are governed by the law of the place of performance, the
rule that liability for torts is governed by the law of the place
where the injury is inflicted, and the "acceptance" of the Wiscon-
sin Act by the employee by failure to give written notice of non-
acceptance. A most interesting case is Barnhart v. American
Concrete Steel Co.7 5 There the contract was made in New Jersey
with a New Jersey corporation; the injury occurred in New York.
An action for wrongful death was brought in New York, and
recovery was denied. The New York Wrongful Death Statute
applied only when the person killed had a common-law action.
The court reasoned that under the New Jersey "optional" Work-
men's Compensation Act, there was a contract in the strict sense
under which the statutory scheme of compensation was substituted
for the common-law remedies. This contract, not being opposed
to the public policy of New York, barred this action.
The cases in North Carolina, which has no Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, require special treatment. In Farr v. Babcock
Lumber Co.,77 the contract was made in Tennessee; the injury
occurred in North Carolina. This was a common-law action for
damages. The defendant contended unsuccessfully that the con-
tract was subject to the provisions of the Tennessee Act and that
the North Carolina court had no jurisdiction. The court said:
74(1915) 128 Minn. 158, 150 N. W. 620.
75(1920) 227 N. Y. 531, 125 N. E. 675. The opinion in the appellate
division is noted in 18 Col. L. Rev. 377.
76An easier case reaching the same result is Prdich v. N. Y. Cent. R.
Co., (1920) 111 Misc. 430, 183 N. Y. S. 77. The contract was made in
New Jersey, and the death occurred there. The New Jersey Wrongful
Death Statute also applied only where the decedent would have had an
action for damages if he had lived.
A similar case is Anderson v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., (1925) 124
Misc. 829, 209 N. Y. S. 493. There the contract was made in New Jersey;
the injury occurred on the Hudson River, death resulting in New Jersey.
Suit was brought upon the New Jersey Death Statute. The complaint
was dismissed on the ground that the sole remedy was under the New
Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act.
77(1921) 182 N. C. 725, 109 S. E. 833.
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"As now advised, especially in the absence of an opposing
interpretation by the supreme court of Tennessee, we are of
opinion that the sections of the Workmen's Compensation Act
cited and relied on by the defendant do not purport to interfere
vith the jurisdiction" of the North Carolina court.
In a recent case, Johnson v. Carolina C. & 0. Ry. Co.,"8 the
same court went even further. In that case not only was the con-
tract made in Tennessee, but the injury occurred there. In hold-
ing that the plaintiff could maintain a common-law action for
damages in North Carolina, the court used this strange language:
"To hold that a citizen of this state, under such circumstances,
had no remedy except that provided by the Tenriessee Compensa-
tion Act in force in the state in which he was injured, having been
induced to go there to work in an emergency, would be a denial
of any remedy in the courts of this state. This court cannot so
hold."
Of course, where the court finds that the Act of another juris-
diction79 or of its owns °0 does not apply to the injury, other relief
will be granted.
VI. THE EFFECT OF THE LOCAL ACT OR THE ACT OF ANOTHER
JURISDICTION AND OTHER FACTORS UPON A CoioN-LAw
ACTION FOR DAMAGES OR SOME OTHER ACTION NOT
BASED UPON A WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
Under this heading will be stated without comment a number
of cases which show how complex are some of the questions
which have arisen.
The fact that a plaintiff had received payments under the Act
of Illinois, in addition to a finding that the Illinois Act applied to
the injury aided a Missouri court in denying recovery in a
common-law action for damages."1
Three interesting cases are of sufficient similarity to be con-
sidered together. In Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Chartrad,"
the employment and injury were in New Jersey. Under the New
Jersey Act, the employee was paid certain amounts by the plain-
78(N.C. 1926) 131 S. E. 390, noted in 40 Harv. L. Rev. 130. With
regard to another phase of this case, see the text to note 15.79Marra v. Hamburg-Am. P. A. Gesellschaft, (1917) 180 App. Div.
75, 167 N. Y. S. 74.80Hamm v. Rocnvood Sprinkler Co., (1916) 88 N. J. L. 564, 97 At.
730; Reynolds v. Day, (1914) 79 Wash. 499, 140 Pac. 681, L. R. A.
1916A 432, 5 N. C. C. A. 814; Cogliano v. Ferguson, (1917) 228 Mass.
147, 117 N. E. 45.8 1Mitchell v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., (1919) 202 Mo.
App. 251, 269, 215 S. NV. 506.
92(1924) 239 N. Y. 36, 145 N. E. 274, noted in 25 Col. L. Rev. 383,
34 Yale L. Journ. 441, 10 Cornell L. Quart. 364, 366.
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tiff insurance company. Later the employee sued in New York
the third person who had caused the injury, and recovered judg-
ment. Prior to the payment of the judgment, a statement of the
compensation agreement was filed with the judgment debtor.
Under the New Jersey Act, the insurance company then became
entitled to receive from such third person a sum equivalent to
the compensation payments. The money paid on the judgment
being in New York under the jurisdiction of the supreme court,
it made an order impressing an equitable lien on the proceeds of
such judgment. This order was affirmed by the court of appeals
on the ground that the common-law action for negligence arising
in New Jersey was limited by this provision of the Act. The
court was careful to say that there was no statutory lien. Instead,
said -the court:
"The employee will be presumed to have received the money
from the third party for the purpose of doing that which in law
and good conscience he ought to do--return so much of it as he
has received in advance under the Workmen's Compensation Law
of New Jersey, from his employer or the insurance carrier..
Equity will impress upon the funds a lien in order to accomplish
this purpose."
A slightly different situation was presented in Rculcnik v.
Gibson Packing Company.8" There the employer was a corpora-
tion having its principal place of business in California. The
employee was fatally injured by the defendant in Washington.
The widow received in California an award for compensation of
$5,000. In this action, the personal representative of the deceased
sued under the Washington Wrongful Death Statute, and the
suit resulted in a verdict and judgment for $9,000. The judg-
ment awarded a lien thereon against the interest of the widow
to the extent of the sum paid by the insurance company under the
California award. The California Act provided for such a lien.
In affirming the judgment, the court said that the California Act
and the construction thereof were part of the contract of insur-
ance, and that the provision for a lien in the California Act was
not prohibited by any law of Washington.
Another variation is found in Rorvik v. Northern Pac. Lunt-
ber Co.84 There, apparently the contract was made in California;
the death occurred in Oregon. The widow brought an action
under the Oregon Employers' Liability Statute against the third
person, the servants of which caused the death, and recovered a
83(1924) 132 Wash. 108, 231 Pac. 773.
84(1921) 99 Ore. 58, 190 Pac. 331, 195 Pac. 163.
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judgment for $12,500. The defendant set up as a bar to the action
an award of compensation of $5,000 in California against the
employer of the deceased. An appeal from the award was pend-
ing in California. Under the California Act, the making of such
a claim operated as an assignment to the employer of the claim-
ant's rights against third persons, subject to a duty in the employer
to pay to the claimant any amount recovered in excess of the
amount paid by the employer on the award. The judgment was
affirmed on the theory that at the least the claimant was part
owner of the cause of action and as such could sue on the refusal
of the employer to do so, and that the employer was precluded
from suing.
No better case with which to close this paper can be found
than Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., not only because of
the complexity of the questions involved, but also because of the
clarity of thought shown in the opinion. In that case, the con-
tract of hire was made in Wisconsin; the injury occurred in
.Michigan. The action, based upon the Michigan survival statute,
was brought by the administratrix of the estate of the decedent
against the employer and its officer, one Miller, who caused the
death. The plaintiff recovered a judgment for damages which
was reversed on the ground that the Wisconsin Act governed the
liability arising out of the injury.86
The subsequent history of the case is of interest. After the
judgment was reversed, on remittitur, a motion was made to
dismiss the action as to both defendants. No objection was made
as to the employer, but both the plaintiff and the employer ob-
jected to the dismissal of Miller. But the motion was granted,
and the employer appealed. In the meantime the widow secured
an award for compensation under the Wisconsin Act.17  On its
appeal 8 the employer claimed to have acquired this cause of action
against Miller by virtue of a provision in the Wisconsin Act for
assignment of tort actions after compensation was claimed. It
was held that there could be no recovery as such assignee. The
court said :"
"It is beyond the power of the legislature of this state to divert
this action from the plaintiff administratrix. . . .To attribute
85(1919) 169 Wis. 106, 170 N. W. 275, 171 N. W. 935.
86For the cogent reasoning of the court see the text to note 65.87Affirmed on appeal in Miller Scrap Iron Co. v. Boncher, (1921) 173
Wis. 257, 180 N. W. 826."88Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (1922) 176 Wis. 521, 182 N. V.
852, 187 N. W. 746.89(1922) 176 Wis. 521, 532.
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power to our legislature to thus interfere with a cause of action
springing from the statutes of another state is to accord to the
enactments of the legislature of this state extraterritorial effect.
It is beyond the power of the legislature of this state to provide
that one person can assign a cause of action which belongs to
another, or that any act on the part of one shall operate as an
assignment of a cause of action arising under the laws of a sister
state, and which the statutes of that state vest in another."
CONCLUSION
A few suggestions for improvement with regard to some of
the problems discussed above will conclude this paper.
As to the scope of the Act of a particular jurisdiction, there
is need for legislative definition. The attempts of the courts to
work this out by the use of common-law analogies has produced
theoretical absurdities and practical harm because of uncertainty.
The latter aspect of the situation is shown by the vast amount of
litigation on the matter in the appellate courts alone. What the
legislative definition should be, the writer does not attempt to say.
But the main desideratum should be certainty9 so that employers
may arrange insurance and other matters accordingly, and so that
needless litigation may be prevented. Uniform legislation on the
subject should be the ultimate aim. 91 Workmen's compensation is
of purely statutory origin, and therefore it is not unreasonable to
ask for further legislation on this phase of such Acts.
Another possible tool for improvement, suggested by the
Anglo-French convention,9 2 is interstate agreements with the con-
90A model of clearness and definiteness is the Pennsylvania Act:
"This Act shall . . .apply to all accidents occurring within this Com-
monwealth, irrespective of the place where the contract of hiring was
made, renewed, or extended, and shall not apply to any accident occurring
outside of the Commonwealth." Pa. Laws 1915, Act. no. 338, art. I, sec-
tion 1.
It is not without significance that no cases have been found involving
the construction of that section.
91The Act proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws contains some useful suggestions in this and other
problems discussed in this paper. See particularly sections 4, 42.
92This agreement deals with the recovery of compensation where
British subjects are injured in France and vice versa. This convention
is attached as a schedule to a statute, 9 Edw. 7, c. 16, authorizing the
effectuation of the convention by Order in Council. The order has been
made. See Elliott, Workmen's Compensation Acts, 8th ed., p. 689. For
the arrangements made for payment, see Knowles, Law Relating to Work-
men's Compensation, 4th ed., p. 459.
The amending Act of 1923 has facilitated like conventions with other
countries. 13 & 14 Geo. V, c. 42, s: 26 (1). Provision is made for Orders
in Council to effectuate future conventions.
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sent of Congress under the "compact" clause of the federal con-
stitution.9 3
The same methods of improvement may be used to advantage
with regard to the problem of enforcing in one jurisdiction a
right to compensation arising under the Act of another jurisdic-
tion.9
Perhaps the easiest and most needful reform is vith regard
to deductions for the receipt of compensation or the recovery
of damages in another state. Just as are the New York cases 5
which allow deductions for payments of compensation under the
Act of another state, they are hard to support theoretically since
in theory the two claims are upon separate and distinct statute-
created rights.9 6  Hence no question of res judicata in any accur-
ate sense is involved.9 7  Here again the same methods of reform
are available. In fact, legislation upon this matter is not un-
known.98
93Art. I, sec. 10. As to the use of that expedient in other fields, see
Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L. Journ. 685; Chafee, Interstate
Interpleader, 33 Yale L. Journ. 685, 727.94See the provision in section 42 of the Act proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
95See text to footnotes 67, 68, 69, 70, 71.
96Perhaps the Act of a particular jurisdiction might be construed to
limit the claimant to the recovery of a certain amount in whatever manner
derived. The writer is indebted to Professor Beale for this suggestion.
Such a construction would be unnecessary, of course, if there were express
legislation or interstate agreement upon the matter.97But see 10 Cornell L Quart 364, 366.
98See Ga. Laws 1920, Act. no. 814, sec. 37; Md. Laws 1922, ch. 529.
Both of these provisions relate to the recovery of damages as well as the
receipt of compensation.
